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HURRY UP AND WAIT: NEGATIVE
STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN THE
GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY SETTING
JOHN MARTINEZ*
Elizabeth Swann (captive heroine):
"But you have to take me to shore! According to the
[pirate] code..."
Captain Barbossa (pirate captor):
"First, your return to shore was never part of our
negotiations nor our agreement, so I must do nothin'.
Secondly, you must be a pirate for the Pirate's Code to
apply, and you're not. And thirdly, the code is more what
you'd call 'guidelines' than actual rules. Welcome aboard
the Black Pearl, Miss Turner!"'
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. B.A.,
Occidental College, J.D., Columbia University School of Law. This article was funded in
part by the University of Utah College of Law Excellence in Teaching and Research Fund.
1 Copyright 2003 Disney Enterprises, Inc. and Jerry Bruckheimer, Inc.; Memorable
Quotes from PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL, available at
Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0325980/quotes (last visited
January 15, 2005).
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NEGATIVE STATUTES OF LIMITATION
INTRODUCTION
Negative statutes of limitation force those who want to bring
tort suits against the government to hurry up and wait. 2 First,
the claimant must hurry to file a "notice of claim" informing the
government that the claimant has a tort claim. Then, the
claimant must wait until the expiration of a waiting period
during which he or she will be prevented from filing suit. This
article suggests that, like the Pirate's Code, negative statutes of
limitation should be viewed more as "guidelines" than actual
rules.
The article critically examines the nature and effect of the
waiting period imposed by negative statutes of limitation and
suggests that such statutes should not be construed as
jurisdictional. Instead, they should be viewed as procedural
provisions which do not deprive courts of subject matter
jurisdiction, but merely allow governmental defendants to seek
extensions of the time to respond to tort complaints or to seek
temporary stays of such judicial proceedings. Treating negative
statutes of limitation as procedural would more properly balance
the interests of the government and the claimants involved.
The context of the problem requires understanding how tort
suits against the government proceed. 3 Claimants seeking to sue
the government in tort first must file a notice of claim that sets
out the surrounding events and the relief sought. For example, a
claimant rear-ended by a city fire truck would set out in the
notice of claim the date and location of the accident, identify the
truck and driver, and state the amount of damages demanded. A
notice of claim may be as informal as a letter, and usually is filed
with a designated government official, such as a city recorder or
clerk.
2 This article is concerned with suits for tort liability, since notice of claim
requirements and their concomitant negative statutes of limitation typically do not apply
outside the tort claim setting. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(1)(a) (McKinney 2004)
(notice of claim requirement is not applicable to "any case founded upon tort .. "); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 6-30-5(1) (1953) (repealed 2004) (reenacted in UTAH CODE ANN. § 60-30d-301
(2004)) ("Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to
[notice of claim or negative statute of limitations requirements].").
3 This article discusses suits against federal, state and local governments. For
purposes of this preliminary description of the problem, the generic term "government" is
used in order to convey the basic idea of negative statutes of limitation.
20051
262 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:2
The "hurry up" part of suing the government is a relatively
short (conventional) statute of limitations which applies to the
filing of a notice of claim. These statutes of limitation range from
ninety days to one year after the claim arises.4 Claims are
usually deemed to arise when the last event giving rise to the
claim occurs. 5 Thus, a claim based on a rear-ending accident
would arise at the time the accident occurred.
This article focuses on the series of events after the claimant
files the notice of claim and demonstrates how the imposed
4 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-821.01(A) (2004) ("within one hundred eighty days
after cause of action accrues"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:8-8 (2004) ("not later than the
ninetieth day after accrual of the cause of action."); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(1)(a)
(McKinney 2004) ("within ninety days after the claim arises"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-
12 (1953) (repealed 2004) (reenacted in UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-402 (2004)) ("within
one year after claim arises"), UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-13 (1953) (repealed 2004)
(reenacted in UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-402 (2004)) ("within one year after claim arises").
5 The limitations period begins to run when the cause of action accrues, which in turn
occurs upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.
Bank One Utah, N.A. v. W. Jordan City, 54 P.3d 135, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)
In Bank One Utah v. West Jordan City, the court explored the situation when a
claimant was not aware that it was the government, and not a private party that caused
the harm, until the one-year time limit for filing a Notice of Claim had expired. Id. at 136.
Upper Valley Utilities (UVU), a private company, had conducted excavation in front of the
Bank One building in early March 1999 to install a fiber optic conduit. Id. By March 15,
however, Bank One's toilets starting backing up. Id. On that day, the Bank had both a
UVU and a City inspector come out to look at the problem. Id. Not surprisingly, perhaps,
each inspector blamed the other's company for the problem. Id. Bank One therefore hired
its own contractor, who determined on March 22, 1999, that the City had been responsible
for marking all utilities prior to UVU's excavation, that the City had not properly marked
the sewer line, and that as a result, UVU had drilled through the. sewer line. Id. Bank
One's contractor finished repairs on April 1, 1999, at a cost of $29,986.49. Id.
• On September 27, 1999, Bank One commenced suit against UVU and West Jordan. Id.
The trial court granted West Jordan's motion to dismiss Bank One's complaint, since the
bank had not previously filed a Notice of Claim. Id. On March 22, 2000, the bank filed its
Notice of Claim. Id. Two months later, the trial court granted UVU's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that it had not caused the problem. Id. The trial court concluded
that the problem had instead been caused by West Jordan City's failure to mark the
proper location for drilling in the street. Id. However, the trial court nevertheless granted
West Jordan's motion for summary judgment, on the ground that the claim "arose" on
March 15, 1999, and that therefore Bank One's Notice of Claim filed on March 22, 2000
was 7 days beyond the one-year statute of limitations for filing such Notice. Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 139. The court concluded:
Obviously, a party cannot have a legitimate 'claim' against a governmental entity
until it is aware that the governmental entity's action or inaction has resulted in
some kind of harm to its interests. Only then does it have not just a gripe against
parties unknown, but a "claim" against a particular governmental entity.
Id. at 137. The claim here thus did not arise when the sewer was punctured, when Bank
One's toilets backed up, or even on March 15, 1999, when the City's inspector denied that
the City was responsible. Id. at 138. And, contrary to Bank One's assertion, it did not
arise on April 1, 2000, when the Bank paid for the repairs. Id. Instead, the court held, the
claim arose on March 22, 1999, when Bank One's contractor informed the Bank that the
problem was caused by the City's failure to properly mark the location of the sewer line.
Id. Thus, the March 22, 2000 Notice of Claim was timely. Id. at 139.
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waiting period needlessly harms claimants. The typical scenario
illustrates the problem. Suppose the relief a claimant seeks in
the notice of claim is substantial, for example, in excess of
$25,000, which would not be uncommon when medical expenses
are involved. The claimant can reasonably expect that the claim
will be denied by the government almost as a matter of course.
This is particularly likely if the accident is not covered by the
city's liability insurance, or if the claim exceeds the city's policy
limits. No real incentive exists for the government to do
anything but deny the claim-or indeed nothing at all-since any
liability established through a subsequent judgment adverse to
the government ordinarily will not include the attorneys fees and
costs incurred by a successful plaintiff.
Tort claimants are deeply concerned about obtaining recovery
for their injuries as quickly as possible. And in cases where
enough money is involved, the government ultimately will refuse
to pay, after a notice of claim, forcing claimants to eventually file
a lawsuit to obtain recovery. Negative statutes of limitation,
however, prevent the filing of a suit against the government until
the waiting period expires, which begins with the filing of a
notice of claim and ends some time thereafter, typically 60 to 90
later.
The purpose of the waiting period is to allow time for
governmental officials to consider the claimant's notice of claim
and to determine whether to pay it or to deny it. The problem is
that such administrative procedures delay the claimant relief
until the end of the often inevitable lawsuit.
Moreover, the waiting period imposed by negative statutes of
limitation is particularly burdensome-and perhaps utterly
unworkable-when a claimant seeks injunctive relief, such as a
temporary restraining order. In that provisional equitable
remedy context, a waiting period defeats the very purpose of the
relief sought because the need for the provisional relief is
typically immediate.
Most courts have held that a negative statute of limitation
deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. 6 Therefore, if
6 See generally Cruse v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Atoka County, 1995 OK 143, 5,
910 P.2d 998, 1000 (demonstrating that trial court may lack subject matter jurisdiction if
action is not initially filed within prescribed statute of limitations).
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a suit is filed prior to the expiration of the disability period
imposed by the negative statute of limitation, the government
may immediately move to dismiss the case.7 More insidiously,
however, since the defect of filing a suit before the negative
statute of limitations period has expired is generally held to be
jurisdictional, the government may simply choose to do nothing
about the jurisdictional defect for some time. Indeed, the
government is free to litigate the case throughout trial and
subsequent appeals, and later move at the last appellate level to
dismiss the case for 'lack of subject matter jurisdiction." In fact,
even without a motion by the government, the court at the last
appellate level may dismiss the action sua sponte.
The effect of a dismissal at the appellate stage may prove
disastrous for the claimant. Since by supposition the claimant
filed the lawsuit before the expiration of the waiting period, the
case typically will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. After such a dismissal, another "conventional"
statute of limitations comes into play: a lawsuit must be filed
within a certain period after the denial of the claim or the
expiration of the waiting period of the negative statute of
limitations. These conventional statutes of limitation typically
range from 90 days to one year.8 If this last statute of limitations
period has expired before the suit was dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, the claimant can no longer file a suit
at all!9
7 See, e.g., Jakoby v. Goddard, 90 P.3d 1209, 1213 (Cal. 2004) (noting that failure of
the information to state facts sufficient to negate statute of limitations is a jurisdictional
defect).
8 See sources cited supra note 4.
9 It is arguable that a state savings statute, which allows filing of suits dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction would extend the time for re-filing a suit even if it had
first been filed prematurely. For example, the Utah savings statute provides:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited either by la law or contract for
commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of
action survives, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year
after the reversal or failure.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-40 (2004).
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 246 (Utah 1988), plaintiffs first brought a suit
against a state governmental entity, but that suit was subsequently dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because plaintiffs had failed to file a notice of claim altogether. The court
held, however, that a second suit, this time against the governmental officials in their
personal capacities, was timely because it had been filed within one year of dismissal of
the first suit, as allowed by the state savings statute. Id. at 254. The case does not
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This article argues that the idea that negative statutes of
limitation are jurisdictional is suspect at best. Part I describes
the sovereign immunity context in which negative statutes of
limitations arose. Pragmatism is used as a descriptive
methodology to examine the nature and impact of negative
statutes of limitation in the government tort liability setting.
Part II sets out a normative theory for prescribing ways in which
the doctrine of negative statutes of limitation in the government
tort liability setting should evolve. The theory distinguishes
between process rules and power rules and sets out the
considerations that weigh in favor of categorizing certain rules as
process rules and others as power rules.
In Part III, the article suggests that when analyzed in terms of
the normative theory of process and power rules, negative
statutes of limitation should be viewed as process rules. Finally,
Part IV considers possible criticisms of the suggested process
approach to negative statutes of limitation.
I. THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CONTEXT OF NEGATIVE STATUTES
OF LIMITATION IN THE GOVERNMENT LIABILITY SETTING
The concept of sovereign immunity is the starting point for
evaluating negative statutes of limitation in the government
liability setting.10 Since the sovereign held all power, no one
address the problem directly, however, because the second suit did not require the filing
of a notice of claim at all because it had been brought against the governmental officials
in their personal capacities. Id. at 252. The case focused on the application of the savings
statute, not upon the effect of that statute on the negative statute of limitations.
A case in the medical malpractice area is also instructive, although it does not address
the issue squarely either. In McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004 UT 21, 1, 94 P.3d 175,
175-76, the plaintiff filed a first suit for medical malpractice without exhausting
prelitigation procedures as defined in the state Medical Malpractice Act. After the first
suit was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust
prelitigation procedures under the state Medical Malpractice Act, the plaintiff filed a
second suit. Id. at 3, 94 P.3d at 176. The defendants moved to dismiss the second suit on
the ground that it had been filed after the applicable statute of limitations. Id. The
plaintiff contended the first suit should "count" for purposes of that statute, and the Utah
Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 9-10, 94 P.3d at 177. It held that the state savings statute,
construed with the policy underlying Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to provide
plaintiffs at least one day in court, warranted extending the statute of limitations for one
year after the first suit had been dismissed. Id. at 16, 94 P.3d at 179.
10 See, e.g., Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corr., 2001 UT 34, 23, 24 P.3d 958, 956
("The rationale ... derives naturally from basic principles of sovereign immunity.").
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could hold the sovereign responsible for his actions. 11 The concept
of sovereign immunity, in its pure form, provided that no one
could sue the sovereign without the sovereign's consent.
11 There were ways in which one could seek relief from the King, but these were
merely at the King's dispensation, not as a matter of right. Justice Traynor explained the
nuances in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist.:
Sovereign immunity began with the personal prerogatives of the King of England. In
the feudal structure the lord of the manor was not subject to suit in his own courts. (1
Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law [1909 ed.] 518.). The king, the
highest feudal lord, enjoyed the same protection: no court was above him. (1 Pollock
and Maitland, The History of English Law, supra, at pp. 512-517; 3 Holdsworth,
History of English Law [1922 ed.] 462.) Before the sixteenth century, this right of the
king was purely personal. (Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant 12 [Johns Hopkins
University Studies in History and Political Science, Series XLV, No. 1 (1927)].) Only
out of sixteenth century metaphysical concepts of the nature of the state did the
king's personal prerogative become the sovereign immunity of the state. (Watkins,
The State as a Party Litigant, supra, at p. 11; see 4 Holdsworth, The History of
English Law, supra, at pp. 190-197.) There is some evidence that the original
meaning of the pre-sixteenth century maxim-that the king can do no wrong-was
merely that the king was not privileged to do wrong. (Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility [sic: Liability] in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 2 [1924]; Ehrlich, Proceedings
Against the Crown (1216-1377) at pp. 42, 127 [Oxford Studies in Social and Legal
History, vol. VI (1921)].)
The immunity operated more as a lack of jurisdiction in the king's courts than as a
denial of total relief. There was jurisdiction, however, in the Court of Exchequer for
equitable relief against the crown. ".... [T]he party ought in this case to be relieved
against the King, because the King is the fountain and head of justice and equity; and
it shall not be presumed, that he will be defective in either. And it would derogate
from the King's honour to imagine, that what is equity against a common person
should not be equity against him." (Per Atkyns, B., Pawlett v. Attorney General
(1668), Hadres 465, 468, 145 Eng.Rep. 550, 552; Dyson v. Attorney- General (1912), 1
K. B. 410, 415.)
The method for obtaining legal relief against the crown was the petition of right. The
action could not be brought in the king's courts because of their lack of jurisdiction to
hear claims against him. The petition of right stated a claim against the king, which
was barred only by his prerogative. To the petition "there must always be a reply: 'Let
right be done,' " (Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against The Crown, 38
L.Quar.Rev. 141, 149) and ".... it is clear that the petition has assumed the character
of a definite legal remedy against the Crown." (Id. at p. 150.) There were procedural
difficulties with the petition, but alternate remedies existed in large part. (Id. at pp.
156-161.)
The main use of the petition of right in the early common law was in real actions,
which then covered a wide field. (Holdsworth, Remedies Against The Crown, supra, at
p. 152.) The basic principle was that the petition was proper "whenever the subject
could show a legal right to redress." (Id. at p. 156.)
The early precedents may even be read as allowing a petition of right against the
king for the torts of his servants. (See the cases of Robert (1325) and Gervais (1349)
de Clifton, discussed in Ehrlich, Proceedings Against The Crown, supra, at pp. 123-
126; Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant, supra, at pp. 20 n. 36.) In Tobin v. The
Queen (1864), 16 C.B.N.S. 309, 111 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 309, however, the court
refused to so read the precedents, and held that the crown was not liable for the torts
of its servants. This decision arose because of the formalistic and mistaken idea that
concepts of vicarious liability did not apply to the crown. (See Holdsworth, Remedies
Against The Crown, supra, at pp. 294- 296; Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant,
supra, at p. 25.) Under the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, however, the crown is today
liable for the torts of its servants to the same extent as private persons. (Hals. Laws
of England, vol. XXXII, " 253 A, B [Cum. Sup. 1953].)
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When governments replaced sovereigns, the concept of absolute
governmental immunity took the place of absolute sovereign
immunity and shielded governments from suit without their
consent. It then followed naturally that if a government had
given its consent to be sued, usually through a statute defining
the circumstances in which the government waived sovereign
immunity,12 the government could set any conditions it pleased
on suits against it, and those conditions had to be strictly obeyed.
The pure form of sovereign immunity exists nowhere in the
United States, however, and probably never did. The foundation
for the power of a government to set conditions on suits against it
is therefore flawed. After peeling back the sovereign immunity
overlay, we can examine the fundamental interests and policies
that underlie modern government tort liability and, in particular,
how negative statutes of limitation should be evaluated in light
of those concerns.
A. Sovereign Immunity and Negative Statutes of Limitation
Sovereign immunity preserves the right of government to
determine the circumstances in which it will be held liable. In its
pure form, sovereign immunity bars recovery against the
government even though there is no question that governmental
conduct has caused private harm. The principle of sovereign
One other protection was afforded the subject injured by the king's servants. Many of
the king's officers were liable for the wrongs committed, and from the earliest times
those officers had to have a sufficient financial standing to make those remedies
against them meaningful. (See Ehrlich, Proceedings Against The Crown, supra, at pp.
200, 214.)
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist, 359 P.2d 457, 458 n.1 (Cal. 1961).
12 There are two principal models of government liability statutes: "closed-ended"
statutes provide that governments are immune unless an exception is provided by
common law, statute, or constitutional provision. States with closed-ended statutes
include: ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-2901 (Michie 1947) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. §
21-9-301 (Michie 2003)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4012 (2004); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5311.202(b) (repealed 1980) (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT ANN. § 8541 (2004));
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. Art. 6252-19 (Vernon
1970) (repealed 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-3 (repealed 2004) (reenacted at UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-30d-201 (2004)); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-105 to 112 (Michie 2003).
"Open-ended" statutes provide that governments are liable unless exempted by
common law, statute, or constitutional provision. States with open-ended statutes include:
ALA. CODE § 11-93-3 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-981(A)(2) (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-
902 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2(B) (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-1 (2004).
Regardless of which model is adopted, the law of each state is unique. See generally 4
C. DALLAS SANDS, M. LIBONATI & J. MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 27.08
(discussing operation of closed-ended and open-ended statutes).
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immunity was originally a sovereign prerogative, often expressed
as "the King can do no wrong," since the King was immune from
jurisdiction in any court, and all courts were subservient to this
royal power. 13
This pure form of sovereign immunity was a potent shield
against the imposition of liability on the Crown. The principle not
only held the King immune from liability, it also prohibited suit
against the King altogether. 14 That sovereign-imposed
prohibition against courts' entertaining of suits against the King
evolved into the modern notion that sovereign immunity deprives
a court of subject matter jurisdiction. 15
Sovereign immunity as royal prerogative was never accepted in
this country. 16 Nevertheless, sovereign immunity in the form of a
legal principle which allows governments to declare themselves
immune from liability for admittedly-caused harm has become
orthodoxy, and has long baffled courts and scholars alike.17 The
concept has evolved in dramatically different ways as applied to
federal, state and local governments.
13 Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1924).
14 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 234-35 (1765).
15 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 14, at 234-35); Ex Parte Dept. of Mental Health and Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 811
(Ala. 2002) (state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought contrary to
sovereign immunity; CAMAS Colo. Inc. v. Bd of County Comm'rs, 36 P.3d 135, 138 (Colo.
App. 2001) (sovereign immunity issues concern subject matter jurisdiction); Antineralla v.
Rioux, 642 A.2d 699, 704 (Conn. 1994) ('"[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates
subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss...")
(quoting Amore v. Frankel, 636 A.2d 786 (Conn. 1994)); Texas Natural Res. Conservation
Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002) (sovereign immunity defeats a court's
subject matter jurisdiction). See generally Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrs., 24 P.3d 958,
964 (Utah 2001) (plaintiffs failure to strictly adhere to notice of claim procedures required
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; defect raised for first time by Supreme
Court sua sponte).
16 See Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879) ("We do not understand
that either in reference to the government of the United States, or of the several States, or
of any of their officers, the English maxim [the King can do no wrong] has an existence in
this country.").
17 However, courts and commentators have remained mystified why the doctrine was
ever accepted in this country. For example, in Butler v. Jordan, 750 N.E.2d 554, 559
(Ohio 2001), the court explains that "[a]lthough the notion of sovereign immunity is best
suited to a government of royal power, American courts nonetheless accepted the doctrine
in the early days of the republic." See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 1033 (5th ed. 1984).
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1. Federal Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Federal sovereign immunity is based on the rather opaque
concept of universal consent and recognition.'S Before 1855, the
only recourse for a claimant seeking damages against the United
States was to petition Congress directly.19 Then, in 1855, as a
result of the delay, inequities, and time involved in the private
bill procedure, Congress created the Court of Claims.20 Under the
1855 Act, however, the Court of Claims could only hear claims,
report to Congress, and submit draft private bills on those claims
the court deemed should be paid.2 1
In 1887, Congress improved on the Court of Claims procedure
by enacting the Tucker Act,22 which waived federal sovereign
immunity and allowed suits to be filed against the United
States.23 The Tucker Act merely eliminated the sovereign
immunity "shield;" it did not provide a substantive claim "sword."
Thus, a claimant still was required to have an independent
source for a claim, such as a statute or constitutional provision,
in order to sue the federal government in tort.
18 See U.S. v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1878) (stating "[t]he United States possess
other attributes of sovereignty resting also upon the basis of universal consent and
recognition. They cannot be sued without their consent."); see also U.S. v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 212 (1983) ( "It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its
consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction."); U.S. v.
Clarke, 33 U.S. 436, 444 (1834) ("As the United States are not suable of common right, the
party who institutes such suit must bring his case within the authority of some act of
congress, or the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it"). See generally Alfred Hill, In
Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C.L. REV. 485, 489 (May 2001)
("[I]mmunity is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, without regard to the form of
government prevailing within the borders of the particular sovereign.").
19 See, e.g., Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 212-13 (citing PAUL BATOR, ET AL., THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 98 (2d ed. 1973)).
20 See Act of February 24, 1855, c. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (creating the Court of Claims).
21 Act of February 24, 1855, c. 122, 10 Stat. 613.
22 The Tucker Act provides in pertinent part:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2004).
23 See id.; see also Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 734 (1982)
(holding that the Tucker Act waives federal sovereign immunity); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v.
United States, 444 U.S. 460, 466 (1980) (per curiam) (stating that the United States is
liable in the Court of Claims because of its waiver of sovereign immunity).
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Further elaborating on federal waiver of sovereign immunity,
the Federal Tort Claims Act,24 enacted in 1946, provides that
claimants seeking to sue the federal government in tort must file
a notice of claim, sometimes referred to as a "presentment
requirement,"25 within two years after a claim accrues. 26 This
presentment requirement is deemed jurisdictional and cannot be
waived. 27
A conventional statute of limitations provides that tort suits
against the federal government must be filed within six years
after the claim accrues. 28 In addition, 28 U.S.C. Section 2675
provides a 6-month negative statute of limitations for such
actions. 29 Under this negative statute of limitations, claimants
seeking to file tort suits against the federal government must
wait until their presentment of claim is denied, or six months
after their presentment of claim was filed, whichever is earlier.30
2. State Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
The notions that states are "sovereign" in our system of
governance, and that immunity is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty, were dramatically confirmed by the United States
Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine.31 The Court held that states
cannot be sued in state courts by state employees seeking
damages for a state's violation of the overtime provisions of the
24 Federal Torts Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946)
(currently codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
25 Boyce v. U.S., 942 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
26 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
27 Attallah v. U.S., 955 F.2d 776, 779 (1st Cir. 1992) (filing of timely administrative
claim is a non-waivable jurisdictional requirement).
28 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).
29 Specifically, it provides:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States... unless
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency
and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing... The failure
of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is'filed
shall... be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
30 See McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("The FTCA bars claimants from
bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.");
see also Brady v. U.S., 211 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 2000) (premature filing of suit properly
dismissed).
31 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.32 It further held that
the powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the United
States Constitution do not include the power to subject
non-consenting states to private suits for damages in state courts
because States are "sovereign," and a component of sovereignty is
immunity.33
The Court, basing its decision on a review of "history, practice,
precedent and the structure of the Constitution,"34 explained that
state sovereignty is not derived from the lth Amendment, but
from "sovereignty which the states enjoyed before the ratification
of the Constitution, and which they retain today ... except as
altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments."35 Three years earlier, in Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida,36 the Court similarly had held that states could not be
subjected by Congress to suit in federal courts for violation of the
federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 37
The Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the special
sovereign character of states confirm that states are largely free
to define the parameters of public responsibility for private harm
within state borders. Following these decisions, sovereign
immunity doctrine in state courts and legislatures has evolved
through four distinct phases: "received common law sovereign
immunity," "judicial abrogation of common law sovereign
immunity," "legislative revival of sovereign immunity," and
"judicial limitation of legislative revival of sovereign immunity."
a. Received common law sovereign immunity doctrine
Traditionally, state courts enforced a relatively strict
governmental immunity doctrine developed at common law, a
model that most closely resembled the pure form of sovereign
32 Id. at 712 (Maine did not consent to suits for overtime pay and liquidated damages
under FLSA and therefore cannot be subject to private suits in state courts); Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2004).
33 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (states cannot be subject to private suits absent
consent).
34 Id. at 754 Congressional abrogation of States' immunity from private suit in their
own courts exceeds Article I power).
35 See id. at 713 (State sovereignty precludes private suits against States in their
courts).
36 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
37 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2004).
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immunity. For example, in Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach,38
the Florida Supreme Court held that no claim for assault and
false imprisonment was available against a city police chief
because:
Under the common law, law enforcement officers were
considered arms of the King and while an officer might be
held liable for his wrongful acts the Government or that
branch of the Government for which he acted, could not be
held liable on the theory that "The King can do no Wrong," or
the theory of Governmental or sovereign immunity. 39
In a society based on the rejection of sovereign prerogative, the
acceptance of absolute governmental immunity based on royal
power begs for an explanation. And nothing explains human
behavior quite as powerfully as "tradition." State courts adopted
a comparatively strict sovereign immunity regime because they
viewed state common law to include the traditional common law
sovereign immunity principles borne of English common law.
The later adoption of the rule was found by modern courts and
scholars to be perplexing, devoid of a rationale: "From the
beginning there has been misstatement, confusion, and
retraction .... How it became in the United States the basis for a
rule that the federal and state governments did not have to
answer for their torts has been called 'one of the mysteries of
legal evolution."' 40
That justification by reference to tradition has been most
recently echoed in 1999 by the United States Supreme Court in
Alden v. Maine,41 in which the court held that states have
inherent sovereignty, accompanied by inherent sovereign
immunity.42 Yet, the incantation of tradition lacks explanatory
power in that context as well.
38 182 So. 228 (Fla. 1938).
39 Id. at 229.
40 Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 458-59 (Cal. 1961) (quoting
Borchard, supra note 13, at 4).
41 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
42 Id. at 713. The court stated that "the founding document 'specifically recognizes
the States as sovereign entities."' Id. (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 71 n.15 (1996)). The court continued: "[t]he generation that designed and adopted our
federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity. Id. at
715.
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b. Judicial abrogation of common law sovereign immunity
doctrine
The common law sovereign immunity tradition gave way in the
1950's to judicial abrogation of the pure form of sovereign
immunity. The Florida Supreme Court was at the forefront of
the movement to remove the shield of sovereign immunity from
both state and local governments. In Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach,43 decided in 1957, the court held that a claim could be
stated against a municipality for the tortious conduct of its police
officers acting within the scope of their duties, explaining:
[T]he time has arrived to face this matter squarely in the
interest of justice and place the responsibility for wrongs
where it should be. In doing this we are thoroughly cognizant
that some may contend that we are failing to remain blindly
loyal to the doctrine of stare decisis. However, we must
recognize that the law is not static. The great body of our
laws is the product of progressive thinking which attunes
traditional concepts to the needs and demands of changing
times. The modern city is in substantial measure a large
business institution. While it enjoys many of the basic
powers of government, it nonetheless is an incorporated
organization which exercises those powers primarily for the
benefit of the people within the municipal limits who enjoy
the services rendered pursuant to the powers. To continue to
endow this type of organization with sovereign divinity
appears to us to predicate the law of the Twentieth Century
upon an Eighteenth Century anachronism. Judicial
consistency loses its virtue when it is degraded by the vice of
injustice. 44
The change begun by the Florida Supreme Court was followed
in quick succession and eagerly embraced by other state courts.
43 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
44 Id. at 133.
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Illinois did so in 1959,45 California46 and Michigan 47 in 1961, and
Minnesota4S and Wisconsin in 1962.49
Twenty years after Hargrove, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court bemoaned the fact that Massachusetts was one of only five
remaining States to retain the common law immunity at both the
State and local levels. 50 As the court noted, forty-five States had
modified or partly eliminated the defense of sovereign immunity
in tort actions against municipal corporations, and all except
thirteen States had abolished or limited the defense in suits
against the State.51 Finally, after having waited four years for
the legislature to act, the court announced its surprising
"intention to abrogate the doctrine of municipal immunity in the
first appropriate case decided by this court after the conclusion of
the next (1978) session of the Legislature, provided that the
Legislature at that time has not itself acted definitively as to the
doctrine,"52 therefore joining the majority of states in the
abrogation of the common law immunity doctrine. 53
c. Legislative revival of sovereign immunity doctrine -
substantive and procedural dimensions
State courts' abrogation of the common law doctrine of state
sovereign immunity was short-lived; state legislatures quickly
revived sovereign immunity. For example, in a state which was
originally one of the first to initiate a change with regard to the
sovereign immunity doctrine, in 1973, the Florida legislature
45 Molitor v. Kaneland, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (Ill. 1959) (abolishing immunity from tort
liability enjoyed by school districts).
46 Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 458 (discarding as "mistaken and
unjust" the doctrine of governmental immunity).
47 Williams v. City of Detroit, 111 N.W.2d 1, 25 (Mich. 1961) (abolishing doctrine of
governmental immunity prospectively).
48 Spanel v. Mounds View School District, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (Minn. 1962) (finding
doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability to be archaic).
49 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Wis. 1962) (extirpating doctrine
of municipal immunity).
50 Whitney v. City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (Mass. 1977) ("[W]e have no
doubt as to our power to abrogate the doctrine of governmental immunity. We also have
no doubt that the time for change is long overdue.").
51 See id. (citing Note, Governmental Tort Immunity in Massachusetts: The Present
Need for Change and Prospects for the Future, 10 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 521, 523-524
(1976)); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§
25.00-25.00-2 (1976).
52 Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1212.
53 See id. (stating intention to abrogate sovereign immunity).
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enacted a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, cutting back on
the wholesale judicial abrogation. 54 A similar pattern developed
in other states, including Arkansas,5 5 California, 56 Colorado,
57
Illinois,5 8 Kansas, 59 Maine,60 Michigan, 61 Minnesota, 62 New
Jersey, 63 and Wisconsin. 64
54 See FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (2003) (waiving sovereign immunity for governmental tort
liability subject only to limited liability enumerated). See generally Cauley v. City of
Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379, 381-82 (Fla. 1981) (stating "common law sovereign immunity
for the state, its agencies, and counties remained in full force until section 768.28's
enactment").
55 See Parish v. Pitts, 429 S.W.2d 45, 53 (Ark. 1968) (limiting sovereign immunity to
"imperfect, negligent or unskilled execution of a thing ordained to be done"), superseded
by ARK. CODE ANN. tit. 21, ch. 9, § 301 (1969) (stating list of government entities immune
from liability except to extent they are covered by liability insurance).
56 See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 461-62 (rejecting doctrine of
sovereign immunity for tort liability and analyzing reasons why doctrine arose, declined
and was subsequently abolition), superseded by statute as stated in Valley Title Co. v. San
Jose Water Co., 57 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1498-99 (Ct. App. 1997) (listing the statutes
reinstating governmental immunity).
57 See Evans v. County Comm'rs of El Paso, 482 P.2d 968, 971-72 (Colo. 1971)
(abolishing sovereign immunity and notifying the legislature that it is free to say
otherwise), superseded by COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 24, art. 10, § 101 (1972).
58 See Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist., 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (Ill. 1959) (abolishing
tort liability immunity for Illinois school districts), superseded by statute as stated in
Harrison v. Hardin County Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 758 N.E.2d 848, 851-53 (Ill.
2001) (explaining the measures taken by the Illinois legislature in response to the
decision in Molitor).
59 See Carroll v. Kittle, 457 P.2d 21, 27 (Kan. 1969) (abolishing governmental
immunity for negligence when the government is engaged in a proprietary activity),
superseded by statute as stated in Commerce Bank v. State, 833 P.2d 996, 1001 (Kan.
1992) (explaining public entity immunity from tort and contract liability).
60 See Davies v. Bath, 364 A.2d 1269, 1273 (Me. 1976) (eliminating government
immunity as a tool for dismissal of tort actions), superseded by ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 8103 (West 1977) (repealed 1987) (stating all governmental agencies are immune
from all tort claims seeking damages).
61 See Williams v. Detroit, 111 N.W.2d 1, 11-12 (Mich. 1961) (explaining the judicial
decision to eliminate governmental immunity from tort liability), superseded by statute
stated in Weaver v. City of Detroit, 651 N.W.2d 482, 484-85 (Mich. 2002) (noting
enactment of a statute creating governmental immunity from tort liability involving
governmental functions).
62 See Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. Dist., 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (Minn. 1962)
(expressing the court's intention to overrule the doctrine of sovereign immunity),
superseded by statute as stated in Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 330
(Minn. 1990) (noting the Minnesota statute that abolished the court's prior decision to
overrule sovereign immunity).
63 See Willis v. Dept. of Conservation & Econ. Dev., 264 A.2d 34, 36-38 (N.J. 1970)
(disapproving of sovereign immunity and discussing consequent public entity tort
liability), superseded by statute as stated in Gilhooley v. County of Union, 753 A.2d 1137,
1140 (N.J. 2000) (noting the statute overruling the court's prior decision to expand public
entity tort liability).
64 See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 624-25 (1962) (rejecting the
doctrine of municipal immunity), superseded by statute as stated in Wesley v. City of
Milwaukee, No. 96-3283, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 525, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App. April 21, 1998)
(noting the statute reinstating government immunity).
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This subsequent legislative revival of sovereign immunity
erected both substantive and procedural obstacles for claimants
against recovery for harm caused by governmental conduct.
Substantively, categories of conduct (or harm caused by such
conduct) for which states are immune has increased
dramatically. Closed-ended statutes, such as that in
Pennsylvania, immunize state and local governments from tort
liability, subject to legislatively defined exceptions. 65 An example
of a legislatively defined exception in Pennsylvania provides that
local governments are liable for a dangerous condition of traffic
signs, lights, and other traffic controls, but only if (1) an action
could have been brought at common law against a private person;
(2) the injury was caused by negligent acts within the scope of
traffic control duties (not criminal, fraudulent, malicious, or
willful conduct, for which only an action against the government
employee personally might be available); (3) the harm occurred
as a result of a dangerous condition of the traffic controls; (4) the
dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the
kind of injury incurred; (5) the local government had actual
notice or could reasonably be charged with notice under the
circumstances; and (6) such notice was acquired at a sufficient
time prior to the event for the government to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.66 The
substantive exceptions to liability, as illustrated by this example,
can rival the tax code in their intricacy, presenting claimants
with formidable obstacles to recovery.
Procedural requirements are equally troublesome for unwary
claimants. It is helpful to understand these procedures in terms
of a time line consisting of four major points and three
intervening periods of time. "Point 1" is the date of injury. 67 It is
followed by "Period A," a conventional statute of limitations
65 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541 (West 2004) ("Except as otherwise
provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of
any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee
thereof or any other person").
66 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8542(a), 8542(b)(4) (West 2004) (outlining the
requirements to, and condition upon which, local governments may be held liable for a
dangerous condition of traffic signs, lights, and other traffic controls).
67 See Bank One Utah, N.A. v. West Jordan City, 2002 UT App 271, 8, 54 P.3d 135,
136 ("Limitation periods begin to run when a cause of action has accrued, which occurs
upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." (quoting
Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 1993))).
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defining the period within which a notice of claim must be filed
with the governmental agency. That period ends with "Point 2,"
the last date when the notice of claim can be filed.
"Point 2" marks the start of "Period B," the negative statute of
limitations, defining the period during which the claimant must
wait for the governmental agency to consider the claim. That
period ends with "Point 3," the last day of the waiting period. If
the government takes no action, the claim is deemed denied as of
that date. 68 "Point 3" marks the start of "Period C," a second
conventional statute of limitations, defining the period within
which a suit must be filed in court. That period ends with "Point
4," the last date when such suit can be filed. The various points
and periods can be depicted as follows:
Point 1 Injury giving rise to the claim.
Period A First conventional statute of limitations to file
notice of claim.
Point 2 Last day when notice of claim can be filed with
governmental agency.
Period B Negative statute of limitations waiting period.
Point 3 Last day of negative statute of limitations
waiting period.
Period C Second conventional statute of limitations to file
suit in court.
Point 4 Last day when suit can be filed in court.
The pure sovereign immunity theory continues to influence
interpretation of such procedural requirements. Thus, courts
consistently hold that since the government may choose not to
allow suits at all, the requirements the government imposes on
the circumstances in which it can be sued must be strictly
obeyed. 69 Such an interpretive approach makes severe demands
for compliance on claimants.
68 Of course, if the government denies the claim at any time during "Period B," that
denial date becomes "Point 3."
69 See Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 106 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1940) (noting that
where the government grants statutory rights of action against itself, any conditions
placed on those rights must be followed precisely).
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The interpretation of such requirements by the Utah courts is
illustrative. In Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City,70 the
court held that a cause of action against the government was
barred where a notice of claim was not filed with the appropriate
official prior to the filing of the suit in court. Similarly, in
Hamilton v. Salt Lake City,71 the court held that the plaintiffs
suit was precluded even though she had provided the city notice
of her claim, since she had not verified her letter of notice with
an oath as was then required by the statute. And in Yearsley v.
Jensen,72 the court upheld a trial court's decision dismissing the
plaintiffs suit as time-barred because she had filed her notice of
claim one day late. In Scarborough v. Granite School District,73
the court held that the plaintiffs claims against a school district
were defective for failure to provide notice as required by the
statute, despite the fact that the plaintiff had spoken with the
principal at the school in question, and the principal had then
reported that conversation to district officials. Similarly, in
Varoz v. Sevey, 74 the court found the plaintiffs claims against a
county were barred even though the county had conducted a
"comprehensive investigation" into the matter and thus had
"actual knowledge of the circumstances" giving rise to the
claim.75
d. Judicial limitation of legislative revival of sovereign
immunity
The enthusiastic revival of sovereign immunity by state
legislatures has given rise to the fourth, still nascent, phase of
state sovereign immunity doctrine under state law. State courts
have tentatively reentered the field by interpreting state
constitutions as restrictions on legislative power to re-introduce
sovereign immunity legislatively.
70 49 P.2d 405 (Utah 1935).
71 106 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1940).
72 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).
73 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975).
74 See 506 P.2d 435 (Utah 1973), modified by Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 578-79
(Utah 1993) (recognizing a tolling exception to the Governmental Immunity Act for claims
brought by minors); see also Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977)
(applying the notice of claim provision despite the fact "law enforcement officers
investigated the accident [at issue] and filed a report").
75 506 P.2d at 436. See generally 4 SANDS ET AL., supra note 12, at § 27.27 (1995)
(discussing strict compliance requirement with respect to notice of claim).
278
2005] NEGATIVE STATUTES OF LIMITATION
State Just Compensation clauses have served as the doctrinal
basis for state courts to curtail legislative revival of sovereign
immunity. 76 Like the federal Just Compensation Clause, 77 the
state clauses provide that state and local governments shall not
take private property for public use without paying the owner
just compensation. 78 Forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia have Just Compensation clauses in their state
constitutions. Of these forty-eight, sixteen states and the District
of Columbia prohibit "taking" of private property. 79 Twenty-four
states prohibit takings and also prohibit "damaging" of private
property.8O Eight states prohibit takings and also prohibit private
property from being "applied to public use."8 1 Kansas has
76 Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND L. REV. 57 (1999) (providing a
detailed discussion of the development of state Just Compensation Clauses).
77 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The federal Just Compensation Clause provides, "[nior shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Id. The federal Just
Compensation Clause applies to state and local governments through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which states "[n]or shall any State deprive any
person of ... property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The
Court has asserted that private property taken by a State for public use without
compensation to the owner, even if pursuant to a state statute, is in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
78 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged for
public use only when just compensation.., has first been paid to... the owner."); UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 22 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation.").
79 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (District of Columbia); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11
(Connecticut); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6 (Florida); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14, 2 (Idaho); IND.
CONST. art. I, § 21 (Indiana); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18 (Iowa); ME. CONST. art. I, § 21
(Maine); MD. CONST. art. III, § 40 (Maryland); MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (Michigan); NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (Nevada); N.J. CONST. art. I, 20 (New Jersey); N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 7(a) (New York); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19 (Ohio); OR. CONST. art. I, § 18 (Oregon); R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 16 (Rhode Island); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 17, 2 (South Carolina); VT.
CONST. ch. 1, art. II (Vermont); WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (Wisconsin).
80 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18 (Alaska); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17 (Arizona); ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 22 (Arkansas); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (California); COLO. CONST. art. II,
§ 15 (Colorado); GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, 1(a) (Georgia); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 20 (Hawaii);
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (Illinois); LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(b) (Louisiana); MINN. CONST. art. I,
§ 13 (Minnesota); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 17 (Mississippi); MO. CONST. art. I, § 26
(Missouri); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29 (Montana); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 21 (Nebraska);
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20 (New Mexico); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16 (North Dakota); OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 24 (Oklahoma); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13 (South Dakota); TEX. CONST.
art. 1, § 17 (Texas) (both "damaged" and "applied to public use" clauses); UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 22 (Utah); VA. CONST. art. I, § 11, 1 (Virginia); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16
(Washington); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 9 (West Virginia); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 33
(Wyoming).
81 See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (Alabama); DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (Delaware); KY.
CONST. § 13 (Kentucky); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. X, 1 (Massachusetts); N.H. CONST. pt.
I, art. XII (New Hampshire); PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (Pennsylvania); TENN. CONST. art I, §
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adopted the just compensation principle by statute82 and North
Carolina's Supreme Court has interpreted a related property-
protection provision in its state constitution to embody the just
compensation principle.83
One such application of a state Just Compensation provision
occurred in Colman v. Utah State Land Board,84 in which the
state planned to breach a causeway in response to the rapid rise
of the water level'in the Great Salt Lake. Anticipating problems
with property owners that might be affected by such action, the
Utah legislature amended the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act85 to limit the liability of governmental entities for
management of flood waters.8 6 Colman operated and maintained
a five-mile-long underwater brine canal running parallel to and
approximately 1,300 feet north of the causeway, which he used in
his business of extracting minerals from deep lake brines.
Colman alleged that the breach of the causeway would cause
water from the south arm of the lake to flow through the breach
under great pressure and cut through the canal banks, creating
turbidity and sedimentation, rendering the use of the canal as a
brine conduit impossible. The State argued that the amendment
to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act shielded the State from
liability. Emphasizing that "[t]he framers certainly did not
intend to allow state government to override the constitutional
guarantee with a legislative enactment,"87 the court held that
Colman had properly stated a cause of action under the state
constitution's Just Compensation Clause.88
21 (Tennessee); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (Texas) (both "damaged" and "applied to public
use" clauses).
82 See Garrett v. City of Topeka, 916 P.2d 21, 30 (Kan. 1996) (interpreting KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 26-513(a) (1993)).
83 See Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 89 S.E.2d 290, 295 (N.C. 1955)
(construing N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1868) (current version at N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19)
("No person ought to be... disseized of his freehold.., or in any manner deprived of
his... property, but by the law of the land.")).
84 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
85 Utah Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to 63-30-20 (1953)
(repealed 2004) (reenacted at scattered provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d).
86 Utah Governmental Immunity Act, ch. 33, § 1 (1984) (amending UTAH CODE ANN. §
63-30-1 (1953) (repealed 2004) (reallocated at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-101)).
87 795 P.2d at 630.
88 Id. (citing UTAH CONST. art I, § 22 ("Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.")).
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Similarly, in Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Company v.
Employers Mutual Fire Insurance Company,89 the state had
acquired a factory in a tax foreclosure, and then let it deteriorate
and become a nuisance. A fire started in the factory and spread
to plaintiffs properties. When the plaintiff sued for the damage,
the state raised the state legislatively-established sovereign
immunity as a bar. The Michigan Supreme Court pointed out
that the legislature's power to "shape the pattern of the State's
immunity from liability" was restricted by the state Just
Compensation Clause and held that the constitutional provision
covered the nuisance-type of "taking" involved, superseding the
state statute. 90
Furthermore, in Burns v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax
County,91 water allegedly had been discharged from a county
storm sewer, causing $50,000 in damage to the plaintiffs' home.
The county moved to dismiss on the ground of statutory
governmental immunity, but the Virginia Supreme Court held
that the complaint stated a claim for "damage" under the state
constitutional provision, which prohibited taking or damaging of
private property for public use without payment of just
compensation. 92 The court held that the state Just Compensation
Clause provided an implied contract right, not a tort claim, when
the government engaged in conduct amounting to a damaging of
private property for a public use.93  Significantly, the
constitutional provision prohibited the state legislature from
passing any law to achieve that result. Accordingly, although it
is not clear from the opinion, even if the county's objection had
89 178 N.W.2d 476 (1970).
90 Id. at 482 (citing MICH. CONST. art. 13, § 1 (1908) (current version at MICH. CONST.
art. 10, § 2) ("Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
therefore being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall
be determined in proceedings in a court of record.").
91 238 S.E.2d 823 (Va. 1977).
92 Id. at 825-26 (holding that allegations of the motion were not demurrable); VA.
CONST. art. I, § XI ("That... the General Assembly shall not pass any law.., whereby
private property shall be taken or damaged for public uses, without just
compensation .... ).
93 238 S.E.2d at 825 (stating "this section prohibits the General Assembly from
passing any law whereby private property shall be taken or damaged for public uses
without just compensation. It is well settled that this constitutional provision is
self-executing, and the landowner may enforce his constitutional right to compensation in
a common law action.").
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been statutorily based, it would have been subordinate to the
constitutional prohibition.
Fundamentally, these cases entail protection of individual
rights under state constitutional provisions by restricting
legislative power. The logical extension of the idea that state
constitutions limit state legislative power to enact government
immunity statutes places state courts in what Alexander Bickel
identified as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," describing the
tension between judicial review of legislation and the democratic
process, particularly when courts use open-ended constitutional
provisions to do so.94 The premise of the counter-majoritarian
difficulty argument is that legislatures are popularly elected and
reflect majority will. 95  Therefore, judicial restriction or
invalidation of state legislature's revival of governmental
sovereign immunity intrudes on the democratic process. 9 6
Judicial intrusion in this field is particularly troublesome,
because the courts' invalidation of legislatively-created immunity
for state and local governments imposes costs distributed over
the tax base as a whole.
It is therefore not surprising that courts in this fourth phase of
the evolution of state sovereign immunity have made only
tentative progress toward limiting legislatively-revived sovereign
immunity. Consequently, it is equally unsurprising that all state
courts that have confronted the issue have held that negative
statutes of limitation are jurisdictional barriers to suit against
states under state law.
3. Local Government Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
The principle of local government sovereign immunity
originated from the uncritical acceptance in this country of
94 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (2d ed. 1986)
(coining the phrase "counter-majoritarian difficulty"). See generally JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) and JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (exploring counter-
majoritarian difficulty in judicial review).
95 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Forward to the Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV.
43, 75 (1989) (discussing criticisms of this underlying assumption of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty argument); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND
LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 149 (1988).
96 See generally Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1529, 1531 (1992).
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Russell v. Men of Devon,97 decided by the Kings Bench in 1788,
and which stood for an altogether different proposition. In
Russell, the plaintiffs wagon was damaged as a result of a bridge
that was out of repair. The plaintiffs problem was the absence of
a jural collective defendant. Although the inhabitants of the area
apparently had a duty to maintain the bridge, no particular
individual was responsible for doing so, and thus there was no
available corporate defendant. As a result, the plaintiffs
attempted to sue "The Men Dwelling in the County of Devon."
The court sustained the general demurrer by two inhabitants,
appearing for themselves and the rest of the men dwelling in the
county, and dismissed the action. 98 Because there was no jural
collective defendant, Chief Judge Lord Kenyon reasoned, there
was no corporate fund from which compensation could be paid.99
Consequently, Judge Ashhurst added, the only possible judgment
would have to issue against the two individual inhabitants who
had appeared in the action, and in turn, they had no means of
reimbursing themselves except by generating a multiplicity of
suits against the other inhabitants.100  Accordingly, Judge
Ashhurst concluded, "it is better that an individual should
sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an
inconvenience."O1 Both judges agreed that any relief should be
provided by the legislature. 102
The absence of a jural collective, causing the prospect of a
multiplicity of lawsuits, was notably absent in the case which
introduced the concept of local government sovereign immunity
to the United States. In Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester,10 3 a
stagecoach belonging to the plaintiff was traveling through the
97 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
98 Id. at 360 (stating that the lack of previous attempts to support such an action
demonstrated that such an action cannot lie).
99 Id. at 362 (noting that where an action is brought against a corporation for
damages, the damages are to be recovered out of the corporate estate).
100 Id. The judge here was proposing that if it were necessary to bring separate
actions against each individual of the county, it would be better to leave the plaintiff
without remedy. Lord Kenyon had expressed the same concern at the outset of his
opinion: "If this experiment had succeeded, it would have been productive of an infinity of
actions." Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. While Lord Kenyon was positing that the Legislature should manage any
liability at law, Judge Ashhurst was indicating that the Legislature would have given a
remedy had it been intended.
103 9 Mass. 247 (1812), overruled by Patrazza v. Commonwealth, 497 N.E.2d 271
(Mass. 1986).
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town of Leicester when one of the horses was killed while
crossing a bridge, which the town statutorily required to
maintain. Unlike the county in Russell v. Men of Devon, the
Town of Leicester was incorporated and possessed a public
treasury out for which a judgment could have been paid. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless denied
relief, reasoning that recovery against the townspeople was
improper because no statute had so authorized.
The court in Mower, therefore, misinterpreted Russell, holding
that local governments are immune unless state legislatures
provide otherwise. Nevertheless, this misinterpretation became
the general American rule.104 As a consequence, notice of claim
provisions and their accompanying negative statutes of '( -
limitation apply with equal force both in suits against states and
against local governments under state law.
B. Impact of Negative Statutes of Limitation-A Pragmatic
Approach
Removing the overlay of sovereign immunity exposes the
underlying rationales of negative statutes of limitation to critical
scrutiny. Since sovereign prerogative does not justify them,
negative statutes of limitation must stand or fall on their own
merits. The costs imposed by their strict interpretation as
subject matter jurisdiction concepts must also be considered.
1. Pragmatism in Legal Analysis: Theory is Fine, Reality is
Better
Pragmatism's overriding concern is with what "works" in
human experience.1 05 Oliver Wendell Holmes is perhaps the most
famous advocate of a pragmatic approach to law. His dictum
that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
104 See Borchard, supra note 13, at 41-42 (noting that the general rule of sovereign
immunity in the United States was based on a "poorly reasoned decision, based upon a
case which contradicts rather than sustains it"). See generally CAL. LAw REvISION
COMM'N, RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-CLAIMS, ACTIONS AND
JUDGMENTS AGAINST PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND PUBLIC ENTITIES (1963); Louis Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 209-13
(summarizing history of sovereign immunity).
105 Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a Guide to
Environmental Protection, 31 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) (discussing the
foundations and application of pragmatism to legal analysis).
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experience" captures the idea concisely.106 In Miller v. Horton,107
the town of Rehoboth ordered plaintiffs horse to be killed,
mistakenly believing that the horse had "the glanders."10 8 As a
shield against the horse owner's suit for recovery for the animal's
value, the town raised a state statute allowing the town to kill
horses suspected of having the disease. The statute did not
provide for compensation to be paid to owners whose horses were
mistakenly killed, as was the case in Miller. Justice Holmes
pragmatically held that it was necessary to examine the actual
impact of the statute on the owner of the horse. The fact that the
town acted reasonably-even if with the utmost care to protect
the community from serious public harm-did not change the
fact that the owner had been deprived of a perfectly healthy
horse. 109
It is helpful to examine the consequences of negative statutes
of limitation through this lens of pragmatism. Such examination
will provide a solid foundation from which to consider real world
alternatives.
2. A Pragmatic Critique of Negative Statutes of Limitation
One rationale for negative statutes of limitation is to prevent
payment of spurious claims. 110 That rationale, however, contains
the seeds of its own refutation. If the purpose is to avoid
payment of unfounded or unmeritorious claims, then the
government can best accomplish that objective by forcing the
claimant to press his/her claim through the judicial system. The
established procedures of court litigation would seem to be the
best safeguard against ill-advised payment of claims, the heat of
106 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1990)
(1881).
107 26 N.E. 100, 100-03 (Mass. 1891) (discussing the policy implications and
constitutionality of construing a statute in various ways).
108 See id. at 105 (Devens, J., dissenting) (noting that the glanders is a contagious
disease, which is dangerous to both man and domestic animals).
109 Id. at 102. Holmes considered who should fairly bear the monetary loss as
between a man and his neighbors when the individual has done nothing but an innocent
act.
110 See Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 1167, 1171 (Utah 1913) (noting that "[o]ne of
the principal objects of the statute is to prevent spurious claims from being paid"); Olson
v. King County, 428 P.2d 562, 571-72 (Wash. 1967) (discussing one of the purposes of
notice of claim requirements in statutes is to allow the government to investigate the
merits of the claim).
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litigation assuring that claimants would be put to their proofs in
the most rigorous fashion.
The "spurious claims" rationale also imposes unnecessary costs
upon claimant and government alike. It provides an incentive for
the rational government decision-maker to do nothing. Why
investigate a claim and mobilize administrative machinery to
evaluate it if the claimant who is unsatisfied with the
administrative outcome nevertheless can thereafter drag the
government into court? The claimant intent on obtaining a
judicial determination of the claim is needlessly forced to wait,
cooling his/her heels while the government does nothing.
Evidence grows stale; witness memories fade; the time value of
money the claimant will ultimately recover is lost or at least
delayed; and the opportunity cost of not having access to that
money is surely lost forever.
A second rationale underlying negative statutes of limitation is
to allow government officials a sufficient opportunity to
investigate the demands in a notice of claim. 11 If harm imposed
on private parties is significant, the governmental entity will
have sufficient notice to mobilize their investigative machinery
even before the claimant files a notice of claim. A serious
accident, for example, is hardly a secret in any organization.
Moreover, insurance policies typically carried by governmental
entities impose comparatively short time limits during which the
entity must notify its insurer that a claim might be
forthcoming.11 2 In light of these considerations, a governmental
entity already has sufficient time and opportunity to investigate
demands from private tort claimants even before a notice of claim
is filed.
Moreover, if no negative statute of limitations applied and a
claimant filed a suit simultaneously with the filing of a notice of
111 See, e.g., Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corr., 24 P.3d 966 (Utah 2001) (noting that
concurrent filing of a claim and notice of such claim deprives the state of the opportunity
to assess the merits of the allegations and to decide whether to approve or deny the
claim); Sweet, 134 P. at 1171 (noting that in the statute at issue, notice of claim was a
condition precedent to the filing of a claim, and the purpose of this requirement was to
allow the government to fully investigate the claim to prevent the payment of spurious
claims); Johnston v. City of Seattle, 976 P.2d 1269, 1271-72 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(concluding that the "purposes of the 60-day waiting period are to enable the City to
investigate claims without incurring litigation expenses and to foster inexpensive
settlements").
112 See 4 SANDS ET AL., supra note 12, § 27.28 (explaining the policy considerations
and practicalities of local government risk management and listing relevant case law).
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claim, there is no reason why the governmental entity could not
immediately commence investigation of the claim. The 20-day
period for responding to a complaint is almost universal, and
extensions on that time period could be obtained by the
government to complete its investigation.11 3
A third rationale for negative statutes of limitation is the
desire to test the good faith of the claimant.1l 4 This rationale is
probably a subset of the interest of the governmental entity to
investigate the claim. Since good faith is largely a subjective
criterion, it is most likely inextricably tied to the factual basis for
the claimant's demands.
A fourth rationale is to encourage inexpensive settlement of
claims against the government.1 1 5 This rationale is usually
described as an interest to avoid litigation through settlement of
claims. Such expenses could be avoided even after a suit is filed,
however, through settlement of the claim soon after a case is
filed. Under those circumstances, the governmental entity will
not incur significant litigation costs. Moreover, since settlements
usually provide that each party will bear their own litigation
expenses, the government will not have to pay the claimant's
litigation costs. If the claimant insists on filing suit as soon as
possible, it would not seem unfair to have the claimant shoulder
the additional litigation costs of such a strategy.
This review of the rationales underlying negative statutes of
limitation in the government tort liability setting reveals that
there is no pragmatic basis for such waiting periods. The
question then becomes one of formulating a normative
justification for treating such statutes as procedural rules rather
than as jurisdictional barriers.
113 See e.g., FED. R. CiV. P. 12(a)(1)(A) (ordering that an answer is due, generally,
within twenty days after service of summons and complaint); UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(a)
(directing, generally, that answers are due within twenty days after service of summons
and complaint).
114 Sweet, 134 P. at 1171 (noting that notice of claim requirements allow the city to
test the good faith of the claimants in filing a claim).
115 Johnston, 976 P.2d at 1271-72 (noting that the dual purposes of the "waiting
period are to enable the City to investigate claims without incurring litigation expenses
and to foster inexpensive settlements").
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II. PROCESS RULES AND POWER RULES
Negative statutes of limitation can be evaluated using a
normative theory that distinguishes between process rules and
power rules. First, it is necessary to describe normative rules
generally, and then to examine the normative structure of
process and power rules.
A. Normative Rules Generally
The relation between normative rules and the legal doctrine of
negative statutes of limitation can be understood in the context
of an analytical framework which incorporates the various
dimensions of legal analysis.116 At its most specific, legal analysis
considers the facts giving rise to legal issues; at its most general,
it considers philosophical conceptions of value. The entire
organizational framework asks the following questions:
(1) Facts: What facts give rise to the specific problems
involved?
(2) Doctrine(s): What established legal doctrine(s) would
ordinarily be expected to resolve the questions thereby
posed?
(3) Standards of Judicial Review: What standards of judicial
review would a court be expected to apply?
(4) Normative Model(s): What normative models underlie the
standards of judicial review in the context of the relevant
legal doctrines?
(5) Philosophical Conceptions of Value: What philosophical
conceptions of value underlie the normative models?117
The "facts" in the negative statute of limitations setting are
straightforward: a person is injured through governmental
conduct and seeks recovery for the harm. The "doctrine" of
government tort liability and the particular role that negative
statutes of limitation play have been explored earlier in this
116 See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination:
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-78).
The analytical framework used herein is derived from Michelman's article.
117 Id. at 147-48 (noting that when deciding one of these cases, judges must have "in
mind a normative model of government" based on ideal conceptions).
NEGATIVE STATUTES OF LIMITATION
article.118 "Standards of judicial review" used by courts to
consider whether to intervene have passed through several
phases and are also discussed above. 119 At this point, we must
formulate a "normative model" that will best implement the
"philosophical conceptions of value" that we seek to apply.
Normative models in American law reflect two distinct
philosophical traditions. The Public Choice model is linked to a
Hobbesian or Lockean notion of freedom:
The general idea is that values, so-called, are taken to be
nothing but individually held, arbitrary and inexplicable
preferences (the subjectivist element) having no objective
significance apart from what individuals are actually found
to be choosing to do under the conditions that confront them
(the behaviorist element); from which it seems to follow that
there can be no objective good apart from allowing for the
maximum feasible satisfaction of private preference as
revealed through actual choice--or, in other words, through
'willingness to pay.' The resulting allocation of resources to
their highest-paying employments is the state known to
economics as efficiency.120
The Public Choice model, emphasizing individual satisfaction,
has been revived by neoclassical economists. 121 Their arguments
rest "on the intuitive propositions that human beings act to
further their own material well-being, that it is fruitless to
attempt to suppress this characteristic entirely, and that the
ability of individuals to act in their own best interest may have
substantial social benefits."122  This proacquisitive position
suggests that property is a prepolitical right, that people should
118 See generally supra Part I.A. (discussing federal, state and local sovereign
immunities and their relationship to negative statutes of limitation).
119 See generally supra Part I.B. (discussing pragmatism in regards to negative
statutes of limitation).
120 Michelman, supra note 116, at 152-53 (discussing "subjectivist conception of
human experience" relevant to economists).
121 See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 7 (1985) (stating Constitution rejects Hobbesian view of political theory,
but does reflect some basic Hobbesian ideas); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-11 (2d ed. 1989) (noting possible conflict between efficiency and
equity); John Cirace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 SW. L.J. 1139, 1144 (1990)
(discussing government intrusion into competitive markets); Adam J. Hirsch & William
K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1992) (explaining
economic benefits of "testamentary freedom").
122 Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 567 (1984).
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be able to act on their economic expectations, and that any
unconsented or uncompensated governmental interference is
wrong.
The Public Interest model, in contrast, traces its roots to a
tradition in Western thought associated with Kant, Rousseau
and Aristotle, and "conceives individual freedom in such a way
that its attainment depends on the possibility of values that are
communal and objective-jointly recognized by members of a
group and determinable through reasoned interchange among
them[;]... freedom is the state of giving the law to oneself."123
The Public Interest model posits that property is socially defined,
with individual preference satisfaction as merely one-albeit
important-objective.124 Public Interest advocates argue that the
allocation of resources is best determined by society collectively
for social objectives that are also collectively defined.
The Public Choice and Public Interest normative models are
useful tools for analyzing the legal doctrine of negative statutes
of limitation in the government tort liability setting. Achieving a
proper balance between the individual and the community is
what government tort liability law is concerned with. The
overriding goal is to assure that government does not force "some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."125 It is in this
way we should consider negative statutes of limitation.
B. Process Rules and Power Rules as Norms
Existing standards of judicial review of negative statutes of
limitation are premised on blind adherence to the principle of
sovereign immunity.126 The only normative principle applied is
the Public Interest normative model. Courts simply ask whether
the sovereign has consented to suit, and proceed to strictly
enforce the preconditions that the sovereign has imposed on the
123 Michelman, supra note 116, at 150 (illuminating connection between public choice
and public interest models).
124 See generally id. at 153-54 (noting the differences between what Michelman calls
"night-watchman" states and "welfare" states); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733, 771-774 (1964) (commenting on relationship between property and liberty).
125 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. V (stating property cannot be taken for public use without "just compensation").
126 See generally supra Parts I.A, I.B (explaining different forms of sovereign
immunity and negative statutes of limitation).
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availability of such suits. If those preconditions are not strictly
followed, there is no claim. Applying the Public Interest
normative model alone, courts conceive of negative statutes of
limitation as "power" rules which divest courts of power to
adjudicate a case. This view is the prevalent judicial
"jurisdictional" approach to negative statute of limitation
doctrine.
Exclusively adopting a "power" rule approach, however, fails to
account for the private interests involved. Courts should apply
both Public Choice and Public Interest normative models in order
to take both individual and community interests into account.
Only in that manner can legal doctrine avoid forcing "some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."127 The
distinction therefore turns on whether any particular doctrinal
rule adequately provides for the private interests affected in light
of the public interests involved.
Some doctrinal rules are properly characterized as "power"
rules because they adequately provide for the private interests
affected in light of the public interests involved. The
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies is an
example. That principle provides that a court action cannot be
commenced until the claimant has utilized available
administrative procedures for resolution of the claim involved.128
Several public interests animate the requirement of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, including judicial deference to the
expertise of administrative agencies and the desire to conserve
judicial resources by keeping cases out of the court system that
can be resolved short of judicial intervention. 129 On the private
interest side of the equation, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies has two singular characteristics: (1) the
procedure is established precisely because the result may be that
the claimant obtains a remedy, thereby relieving the private
interests affected and (2) the claimant is an active participant in
the process of investigation and determination, and has an
127 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (noting the scope of the Fifth
Amendment).
128 See generally 3 SANDS ET AL., supra note 12, § 16.30 (2003) (discussing difficulties
regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies in land use regulation setting).
129 See id. (noting matter is "one of policy, convenience and discretion").
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opportunity to actively engage in the process of healing the harm.
The exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement
addresses the claimant's substantive remedial concerns as well
as the claimant's interest in participating in the resolution of the
problem.
In order to be properly characterized as a "power" rule, it is not
necessary that the private costs imposed by the rule should be
the equivalent of private benefits received from the operation of
the rule. There need only be a "reciprocity of advantage," a rough
correlation between the burdens imposed and the benefits
obtained from governmental conduct.130 Situations of reciprocity
of advantage render moot the logically subsequent question of
whether such costs should be distributed over the population as a
whole.
III. PROCESS RULES, POWER RULES, AND NEGATIVE STATUTES OF
LIMITATION
Application of the Public Choice and Public Interest models
demonstrates that negative statutes of limitation should be
treated as process rules. Under the Public Choice model, we
must consider the manner in which negative statutes of
limitation affect the interests of government tort liability
claimants. The decision to proceed directly to court as quickly as
possible reflects the claimant's preference for expediently
proceeding to formal judicial resolution of the claim.
The preference for judicial resolution of disputes is highly
valued and universally recognized in our system of justice. Our
rules of civil procedure provide litigants with the steps for
obtaining judicial determinations.131 Similarly, "open courts"
provisions in state constitutions embody the right of litigants to
have courts decide their cases. 132
130 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding no
compensation is required when there is a "reciprocity of advantage").
131 See, e.g., McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004 UT 21, 10, 94 P.3d 175, 177 (noting
the policy underlying Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is to provide plaintiffs a
day in court).
132 See, e.g., Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 28, 57 P.3d 1007, 1016, stating the
open courts provision prohibited the legislature's elimination of the city's pre-existing
government tort liability. The court was construing the following constitutional provision:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
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More than a naked preference, 133 the choice to seek judicial
resolution as quickly as possible has substantial consequences for
the claimant who seeks recovery for torts committed by the
government. Evidence may grow stale with the passage of time.
The claimant may be unable to pay substantial medical expenses
that often result from serious personal injury. Witnesses may
move away, die, or lose their memories. The claimant will be
deprived of the time value of a money recovery, which may not be
adequately remedied by payment of interest when payment is
delayed. Finally, the opportunity cost of not having access to a
monetary recovery for an extended period of time may be
exacerbated by the additional waiting period delay in obtaining
judicial resolution.
Applying the public interest normative model, the public
interests involved in negative statutes of limitation would be
adequately protected through treating such statutes as process
rules. Preventing payment of spurious claims will be adequately
protected through judicial resolution of tort claims against the
government. The rigorous process of judicial resolution assures
that the claimants will be put to their proofs.
Treating negative statutes of limitation as process rules does
not preclude the government from conducting an investigation
into the merits of any particular claim. In fact, the judicial
machinery makes available to the government defendant the
powerful tool of discovery mechanisms to ferret out the basis for
the claim involved.
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself, or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
UT. CONST. art I, § 11. See generally Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440, 448 (Tex. 1993) (deciding that the Open Courts provision of the Texas
Constitution guarantees (1) courts must actually be open and operating, (2) citizens must
have access to those courts unimpeded by unreasonable financial barriers, and (3)
meaningful legal remedies must be afforded. Open Courts provisions are present in the
majority of state constitutions); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
1197, 1201-02 (1992), (reporting that 39 states have such clauses in their constitutions);
Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of
State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1994) (discussing the origins of state open
courts provisions).
133 See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1689 (1984) (demonstrating the term "naked preferences" as distribution of
resources by legislatures to a group solely on the basis that those favored have the
political power to get what they want).
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In judicial proceedings, the claimant's good faith is assured
through the mechanism of verified complaints and the provision
for testimony under oath. The interest of the government in
assuring only good faith claims are paid is thereby protected.
Finally, the government's interest in avoiding unnecessary
expenses is adequately provided by rules of civil procedure. The
government may request a stay of the proceedings or an
extension of time to file a response while it conducts an
investigation.134 The need to appear and request such a stay or
extension may itself be an incentive for quick governmental
investigation of claims.
IV. POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF PROCESS APPROACH TO NEGATIVE
STATUTES OF LIMITATION
A possible criticism of viewing negative statutes of limitation
as process rules is that such an interpretation may do violence to
mandatory language in state legislation containing such statutes
of limitation. Such statutes, however, must be construed in light
of the policies underlying state constitutional open courts
provisions and state codes of civil procedure. Both of these
sources of policy dictate that negative statutes of limitation
should not be interpreted as jurisdictional requirements.
Another potential criticism is that such an approach may
endanger all waiting period requirements. Examples might
include medical malpractice prelitigation conditions,135
requirements that landlords serve a notice to quit,136 and
ripeness requirements in federal Just Compensation litigation.137
First, these waiting periods do not share the suspect
foundation of sovereign immunity of negative statutes of
134 See Hathaway v. State, 2002 OK 53, 4, 49 P.3d 740, 746 (Kauger, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he only consequence of the plaintiffs premature filing
is that the state may invoke an ex lege stay and stop all proceedings during the unexpired
term of the time bar.").
135 See, e.g., McBride-Williams, 2004 UT at 7, 94 P.3d at 177 (finding medical
malpractice pre-litigation procedures defined by statute deemed not to be jurisdictional).
136 See, e.g., Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 2001 UT App. 347, 20
n.5, 37 P.3d 1202, 1206 n.5, cert. granted, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002) (defective notice to quit
is not jurisdictional, but merely fails to state a claim, so the defect is waivable).
137 See John Martinez & Karen Martinez, A Prudential Theory for Prouiding a
Federal Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 467 n.84
(2001) (suggesting ripeness requirements in takings litigation should not be viewed as
jurisdictional).
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limitation in the government tort liability setting. Second, such
waiting periods may be examined critically using the analytical
approach described here. Like exhaustion of administrative
remedies provisions, it may be that such waiting periods are
perfectly appropriate given public choice and public interest
concerns.
CONCLUSION
The feudal notion of sovereign immunity is the foundation for
the idea that a waiting period imposed by a negative statute of
limitation in the government tort liability setting is
jurisdictional. We have progressed beyond the feudal, however,
and should now view such waiting periods like the Pirate's
Code-more as guidelines than jurisdictional rules.

